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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
AT RICHMOND. 
MARY BURNLEY WILSON CHRISTIAN, 
AND OTHERS, 
11. 
RICHARD BAXTER WILSON'S EXECUTORS. 
Supplemental Note on Appellants' Claim for Compen· 
sation Out of the Estate Given Widow for Life 
and Renounced by Her. 
APPELLEE'S POSITION 
.In their petition for appeal counsel for the appellants, 
quoting from McReynolds v. Counts, (1852) 9 Gratt. 242, 
alluded to the duty of a court of equity to sequester the 
.renounced estate to compensate disappointed legatees. 
-- ------------.......----
[ 2] 
Their remarks, however, appeared to be quite casual and 
almost, we might say, inadvertent. We therefore thought 
it unnecessary to discuss the matter in our first brief, but 
since considerable space was devoted in the reply brief 
to the· propriety of sequestration and compertsiltion we 
should perhaps indicate our views as to why this is not a 
proper case for the application of the doctrine. 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
The instant case is in importan~ particulars different 
from any case in which this Court has heretofore seques-
tered the life estate surrendered by the widow and applied 
the income therefrom to compensating or indemnifying the 
legatees and devisees who have been d~sappointed as a 
result of the renunciation. 
We will now consider these cases. 
In McReynoldB v. Counts, supra, testator devised 
his real estate to his widow for life with remain-
der to his son Isaac, and bequeathed his personal estate 
to his eight children equally. The widow renounced and be-
came entitled to one-third of the real estate for life and one-
third of the. personal estate absolutely. Held that the life 
estate in two-thirds of the real ·estate surrendered by the 
widow would be sequestered for the benefit of the legatees 
of the personal estate who had been ~is~ppointed ·by the 
renunciation and that Isaac's remainder in the two-thirds 
of the real estate would be accelerated but the accelera-
tion would be subject to the sequestration for compensa-
tion, that is, that as soon as the compensation was com-
plete, Isaac should enter into enjoyment of the real estate. 
[ 3] 
But it will be noted-and this is the feature distinguishing 
this case from the instant case-that Isaac was not a dis-
lVJYPOinted devisee, because he would get the entire real 
estate at the death of the widow in any event, that is, re-
gardless of whether the compensation were then complete 
or not, and two-thirds of it perhaps earlier than actually 
provided by the will. He had no loss to be compensated 
for and could not complain if the surrendered estate was 
used to compensate legatees who had lost by the renuncia-
tion instead of to increase his share beyond that given him 
by the will. 
In Morriss v. Garla1Ul, (1883) 78 Va. 215, the widow 
was given a life estate in the sum of $50,000.00 with re4 
mainder to M, and residue of estate to others. The widow 
renounced and by taking her distributive share reduced 
the residuary personal estate and disappointed the resid-
uary legatees. Held that the $50,000.00 must be seques- . 
tered and the income therefrom paid . to the residuary 
legatees to compensate them for their loss until t~ey should 
be fully compensated or the widow should die, whichever 
should first :happen, whereupon the remainderman should 
r~eive the .corpus of the fund. Here again was accele-
ration of the remainder subj-ect to the claim for compen-
sation. But in this case also the remainderman was not a 
disappointed legatee, because the estate was a large one 
and the residuum of the personalty amply sufficient to 
provide the widow's distributive share without encroach-
ing uP<>n the $50,000.00 fund, so that the remainderman 
· . would certainly receive the same in full at the widow's 
death, if not earlier~ and could not complain, if it was 
sequestrated for the benefit of the disQ!JYPointed residua,ry 
legatees in the meantime. 
[ 4 J 
In Findlay v. Findlay, (1853) 11 Gratt. 434, the will 
gave to the testator's wife a life interest in the personal 
estate she had brought to her husband by the marriage 
(that is, in a given sum) with remainder therein to her 
daughter and also gave the wife a life estate in certain real 
estate. There had been a marriage contract between the 
testator and his wife, and the widow also elected to re-
nounce the will. The questions involved were, first, the 
proper construction of the contract, that is, whether it 
barred the widow's dower only or also cut off her claim 
to her distributive share, and, secondly, the effect of her 
renunciation upon her right to claim under the will. 
Therefore, it was not necessary to set out the terms of 
the will further than above stated. It was held that the 
contract barred her dower only and that she was entitled 
to claim her distributive share, but could not also claim 
under the will, and that ~he life estate given her under 
the will must be surrendered in order to indemnify the 
legatees who were disappointed by her election. While, 
as stated above, the will is not set out except in part, 
presumably there was a residuary clause and the resid-
uary legatees only were the disappointed legatees and the 
daughter was not disappointed. In other words, the case 
seems to have been similar in the respect under consid-
eration to that of Morriss v. Garland, supra. 
The only remaining Virginia case to be considered is 
that of Mitchells v. Johnsm, (1835) 6 Leigh 461. Here 
the testator devised his home tract and certain specific 
property to his wife for life with remainder over, and 
made an immediate gift of the residue. The widow re-
nounced, and it is apparent from the report of this case 
that 'her renunciation did not affect the remainder but 
merely diminished the residuum. It was held that this 
[ 5] 
last was entitled to ccmpensation out of the renounced life 
estate. The case is thus analogous to Morriss v. Garlamd 
and McReynolds v. Counts, supra. 
In none of the foregoing cases, as we have pointed out, 
where the remainders were not accelerated or were accel-
rated only subject to prior sequestration for the benefit 
of disappointed legatees, were the rema.indermen them-
selves disappointed as the result of the renunciation or of 
the application of the principle of sequestration and com-
pensation, while if acceleration without compensation had 
been applied the remaindermen's share would have been 
increased beyond that given them under the will and left 
those legatees who were disappointed by the renunciation 
still entirely uncompensated. Naturally the remaindermen 
could have no complaint in such a case that the rule of 
sequestration and compensation was applied. 
Moreover, it will not be overlooked that in none of the 
foregoing cases was the widow's life estate and the re-
mainder expectant thereon carved out of th,e residuum of 
the estate by the testator. Consequently, it was entirely 
practicable to award compensation in such cases, that is 
to say, the compensation was easily susceptible of c~.l~u­
lation, since the Court had merely to decree a pro-rata 
distribution of the renounced income to the disappointed 
legatees. 
How different it is in the case at bar! Here all are dis-
appointed-all losses are shared by both the remaindermen 
and those not in remainder in strict proportion to their 
interests as originally created by the will. If, therefore~ 
as we have suggested, we should first accelerate the ap-
pellee's part in Share A, we should find that he and his 
half-sisters get, respectively, their five-ninths and four-
[ 6 1 
ninths of the estate, the proportions their father pre-
scribed. Furthermore, the appellee's loss, though relatively 
equal to the appellants', is absolutely greater. We there-
fore submit that this is no case fur compensation, but 
that, on the contrary, the distribution asserted by us in 
our original brief is not only legally proper, but, as we 
shall show hereafter, both highly practical and startlingly 
conformable to the will. 
We are not without authority for these views. Lowry 
v. Commerce Trust Co. (D. C. Mo., 1925), 9 F. (2nd) 472, 
was strikingly similar to the instant case. There the tes-
tato~ devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate 
upon trust that the income from a specified parcel of real 
estate be paid to his brother (the plaintiffs) for a period 
of 20 years and then to them, or their lineal descendants, 
in fee, and that the inoome from the residue of the trust 
estate be paid to his widow for life and then to a dental 
society. The widow, renouncing, became entitled to one-
half the testator's estate, real and personal, including one-
half of the specific parcel of real estate of which the in-
come had·been given the plaintiffs, and, of course, one-half 
of the residue of the trust estate, which was to pass to 
the dental society at her death. Thus not only the plain-
tiffs but the remainderman also was a disappointed legatee. 
The plaintiffs claimed their loss should be compensated. 
Held that the remainder in the one-half .of the property 
in which the widow was given a life estate (:her life estate 
in said one-half being surrendered as a result of the re-
nunciation) was accelerated, and that no compensation 
would be awarded, the court pointing out that the remain-
derman, the Dental Society, was also a disappointed lega-
tee. The court, after stating that the remainder was ac-
celerated, said : 
[ 'l ] 
"This beneficiary has suffered a loss, as well as 
plaintiffs, by reason of the action of the widow. 
Equity would not warrant the court in taking away 
from the Dental Society its bequests to compensate 
plaintiffs for the.ir loss. It would be as reasonable 
to deduct from the plaintiff's legacy or devise to 
compensate the. Dental Society. If a general 
estate remained over from which compensation 
could be made, plaintiffs might press a claim. There 
is no source, however, from which ccmpensation 
can be made, without injury to another beneficiary, 
and it would not be equitable to permit this." 
It willl;le observed that this was a case in which a claim 
tor compensatjon c~uld be urged much more plausibly 
than in the instant case, because the plaintiffs were spe-
cific qevisees, while in the instant case Share B is a part 
o.f the residu'lf,m merely-occupyin~ no preferential posi-
. tion over Share A. 
Another case in which the material facts are similar 
to those now before this Court and in which the same 
principle was applied is Capron v. Capron (Sup. Ct. of 
Dist. of Columbia, 1888), 6 Mackey 340, where the testa-
tor gave $6,000.00 in trust for. his son 0 and $15,000.00 
in trust for his widow for life with remainder to his son A 
and daughter E. The opinion does not state whether there 
was a residuary clause or not, but that is immaterial, as 
it seems that the estate was not sufficient to pay the gen-
eral legacies mentioned. The widow renounced and was 
entitled to one-third of the estate absolutely, it consisting 
entirely of personalty. Held that the remainder in what 
was left of the $15,000.00 was accelerated and there was 
no suggestion that the life estate. of the widow therein 
should be sequestered in order to compensate the son 0, 
but i.t was held that the loss arising from the renunciation 
should be borne ratably by 0 and by the remaindermen 
[ 8] 
after accelerating the remainders. In this case it will be 
noted that the rem,a,indermen were disapp·ointed legatees 
as well as the son 0. 
THE TRUE RULE 
The two cases just mentioned illustrate, we believe, the 
true rule, which, as has been shown, is uncontradicted by 
any Virginia authority. It may be thus expressed: 
EQUITY WILL NOT * SEQUESTER THE WIDOW'S 
LIFE ESTATE FOR COMPENSATION PURPOSES 
WHEN THE LOSS DUE TO HER RENUNCIATION IS 
DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN THE LEGATEES IN RE-
MAINDER AND THOSE NOT IN REMAINDER IN 
PROPORTIONS IDENTICAL WITH THOSE PRE-
SCRIBED IN THE WILL FOR THE GIFTS TO BOTH. 
The foregoing might, more simply yet, be expressed as 
follows: 
Where, as a result of renunciation, one set of takers 
under a will :has been advantaged in time only and not in 
amount, no equity for compensation is raised for the other 
set of takers, the circumstances of both being in all other 
respects precisely equal. 
We submit that no other rule is workable in practice. 
It is true that the doctrine we are contending for, insofar 
(and insofar only) as it may neglect the difference in time 
*and, as we shall show, in justice cannot. 
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of vesting prescribed by the will, fails to attain to com-
plete mathematical equality between Share A and Share 
B; but it is not difficult to show that such equality, while 
attainable in theory, would, in practice, nevertheless lead 
to unwarrantable c·hances of injustice. 
MATHEMATICAL ACCURACY IMPRACTICABLE 
This proposition might most easily be demonstrated by 
a resort to mathematical analysis; but a few simple con-
siderations should show the truth of it. Since the remain-
der interest in Share A must obviously contribute some 
part of the excess demanded by the widow over what she 
was given by the will-if this were not so, it can be shown 
that Share A would ultimately be larger than Share B-
elementary justice as well as theoretical exactness require 
that some part of the widow's renounced interest should 
go to compensate the remainder in Share A as well as 
Share B. We must therefore be able to take the follow-
ing steps: 
(1) Compare the remainder in Share A under 
the will with Share B under tke will, since thus 
only can we accurately determine to what pro-rata. 
part of the renounced estate each is entitled. 
(2) With the ratio so obtained calculate what 
. each must contribute to the widow's legal share, 
and 
(3) In the same ratio distribute the renounced 
estate so as ratably to compensate Share B and the 
remainder in Share A fer their respective contri-
butions, 
----~-~----------- ---- --·--~ 
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( 4) Segregate from Share B such sum as will 
"support" the remainder in Share A, which under 
the will takes nothing until the widow's death. 
It will be seen that the foregoing steps involve corn~ 
paring, adding or subtracting the values of present and 
future interests. This cannot be done until they have been 
reduced to similar terms, i. e., until we temporarily sub-
stitute commuted values for the life estates and remain-
ders really concerned. The factor of commutation will 
obviously depend solely upon the widow's life expectancy. 
By introducing the last named element into the problem, 
or rather,_ by assigning a value to it, we lay ourselves open, 
however, to a double chance of error. This is so because 
the expectancy must determine the size of the remainder 
in Share A and consequently of the precedent life estate 
which will be used to compensate Share Band which must 
be segregated therefrom and kept for ultimate delivery to 
Share A. The same expectancy must therefore determine 
the balance of Share B which is subject to immediate dis-
tribution under the terms of the will. It can be shown 
that such balance increases as t'\le widow's expectancy de-
creases. If, therefore, the widow should die long before 
the expected time, not only would Share B receive its com-
pensating income for too short a period, but it would have 
got less than it should at the initial distribution. The 
res1:1lt would be a double injustice to Sh~re B, and, on the 
other hand, should the widow gr~~tly Ol.ltlive her expect-
ancy, a double injustice to Share A. A mathematical dem-
onstration of the foregoing assertions could readily be fur-
nished. . We submit in any event that this Court should be 
loath to subject either the appellants or the appellee tn 
the chances we have described. On the other hand, the 
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rule we have heretofore adduced, supported as it is by 
respectable authority, does substantial justice to ·both sides, 
is in close conformity with the spirit of the will, and should 
be followed. 
We further submit, however, that should the Court deem 
compensation pro.per, it would be compelled to consider 
the disappointment borne by the remainder in Share A 
and be therefore bound to follow the .course we have just 
suggested, despite the obvious practical objections to it. 
The .argument thWil far may be sununarized as follows: 
C9mpensation out of the renounced life estate· shoulq 
not be allowed; because it is not proper when the only 
thing to be compensated for is a naked acceleration; be-
cause this rule is not controverted by any of the decisions 
of this Court and indeed is sustained by the authorities we 
have already cited, and because although the rule does not 
attain mathematical accuracy, yet it approaches that ideal 
as closely as practicable. On the other hand, if compen-
sation should be deemed pro.per, all the theoretical require-
ments of the .situ~tiP.n ought to be met and the legatees 
compensated in strictest mathematical proportion to what 
they were severally given under the will. 
THE WILL EXPRESSLY PROIDBITS. COM-. 
PENSATION 
We now go further and assert that for still stronger 
and controlling reasons was the Chancellor justified in de-
clining to award compensation. A bare reference to the 
-~-~------------
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terms of the will makes this plain. It is well known, and 
needs no citation of authority, that courts of equity, in 
sequestering benefits renounced, do so only in furtherance 
of the testator's presumed intent.* How then can there be 
any question of compensation in the present case, since 
IN THE EVENT WHICH HAPPENED (i. e., the widow's 
failure to appoint) the testator by his will expressly di-
rected that NO part of Share A should be administered or 
go to his children by his first marriage? The appellants 
are these children. Counsel have repeatedly emphasized 
the necessary presumption that the testato-r when he made 
his will must have contemplated the possibility of a re-
nunciation by his widow and its corollary that she would 
thereby lose her power of appointment. How can they, 
then, assert the right of their clients to compensation when, 
as we have indicated, the last paragraph of that part of 
the will which is before this Court for construction reads 
as follows: 
"I expressely direct that in the event my said 
wife fails to exercise her power of appointment 
over said Share A, said Share A shall be admin-
istered fo.r the benefit only of suck of my issue as 
are also issue of my said wife, Margaret Booze Wil-
son, and none of it shall go to my children by my 
first marriage, or their issue." 
*Note: See Annotation, 5 A. L. R. 1628, et seq. passim; 
especially p. 1632, where it is said, "Compensation cannot 
be claimed as a matter of right." 
[13] 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that no compensation should 
be awarded herein either under the law or under the facts 
of the case. 
J. JORDAN LEAKE, 
Guardian ad Litem of Richard Wilson. 
